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DOES FOOTNOTE FOUR DESCRIBE? 
L.A. Powe, Jr.* 
Does Footnote Four describe? 1\vo of the editors of this, my 
favorite journal, certainly think so: "Footnote Four encompasses 
much of the ensuing half-century of constitutional law."1 They 
join very esteemed company, from John Hart Elyz to the late 
Robert G. McCloskey.3 And, over the years, most conversations 
I've heard agree. The conventional wisdom is that the Court ran 
with the First Amendment, supported voting rights claims, and 
extended judicial protection to those in need of protecting: the 
politically powerless, especially racial and religious minorities. 
While there is more than one meaning of Footnote Four-as 
Louis Luskey, Stone's law clerk, complained4-let me set out 
what I interpret the dominant meaning of Footnote Four to be. 
First, forget paragraph one; Hughes wrote it anyway, and it can 
be fully subsumed by paragraphs two and three.s Second, follow-
ing paragraph two, the Court polices the twin gates of the polit-
ical process: voting and speech. Third, following paragraph 
three, the Court protects, through whatever constitutional provi-
sion is appropriate, those the government stigmatizes. 
I don't think this analysis holds. Until at least 1962, excep-
tions like the Japanese Exclusion Cases and the domestic security 
cases undermine severely the supposed descriptive accuracy of 
Footnote Four. Thereafter, for at least a decade, Footnote Four 
offers a reasonable fit with the Court's results. But an equally 
valid explanation can account for the entire 1938-73 era: the 
Court was combining with the Federal Government and North-
ern elites to create a set of national norms, eradicating in the 
process that which was different or backward. 
* Anne Green Regents Chair, The University of Texas. I would like to thank my 
colleagues Jack Balkin, Doug Laycock, and Sandy Levinson for their helpful comments 
on earlier versions of this essay. 
1. Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey, Is Carotene Products Dead? 79 Cal. L. Rev. 
685, 690 (1991). 
2. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harv. U. Press, 1980) 
3. Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (U. of Chi. Press, 1960). 
4. Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1093 (1982). 
5. But see note 113 infra. 
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Even more than the Civil War Amendments left prior con-
stitutional history in its own era, the New Deal revolution cre-
ated an abrupt constitutional demarcation. What went before 
was legally irrelevant. Its function came to be that of a measur-
ing rod to mark change. Before the revolution the commerce 
power did not reach the coal industry. After the revolution it 
attached to wheat grown for home consumption. That's a switch; 
indeed, it is so much so, that Robert Jackson, who had been on 
both sides, first as the Administration's lawyer and then as a jus-
tifying justice, wondered in a memo whether the Court had any 
future function at all if federal authority were sustained in the 
case.6 Footnote Four answered that question in a big way, al-
lowing the Court to leave the economic realm completely while 
continuing to be a major player in the constitutional landscape. 
The key case, decided just a year after Jackson's majority opinion 
sustained the regulation of home grown wheat, was West Virginia 
v. Barnette,? which, fittingly enough, was also written by Jackson 
(adopting the solo Stone dissent in GobitisB). 
This is the standard Footnote Four thesis. From my perspec-
tive, however, the focus on the Court's protecting minorities re-
sults in a singular inability to see that there was both more and 
less to what the Court was doing. 
First, let me take the evidence on which the role of Footnote 
Four is based. Jehovah's Witnesses, blacks, and organized labor 
won their cases with much greater frequency then they had in the 
pre-1937 period. Since they could not prevail in the political pro-
cess because they lacked the numbers, Footnote Four enthusiasts 
consider them discrete and insular minorities within the scope of 
the Footnote. I'll concede on the Jehovah's Witnesses without 
hesitation; but organized labor is something else again. The judi-
cial victories of organized labor, while marking a change from 
the pre-1937 era, are better characterized as favoritism, this time 
for a new winner. The Old Court with its conservative Republi-
can bias protected economic elites. The New Deal Court, 
manned by individuals whose fealty to the New Deal's economic 
vision was unquestioned, protected an essential organization 
(possibly the most essential) in the New Deal coalition. To be 
6. Thomas A. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone 594 (Viking Press, 1956). 
7. 319 u.s. 624 (1943). 
8. 310 u.s. 586 (1940). 
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sure, organized labor was not popular everywhere,9 but it was 
popular in Washington and that is where it won first major legis-
lative and then major judicial victories. The Court embraced un-
ions not because they were discrete and insular minorities, but 
because they were politically powerful allies.10 While blacks, too, 
were voting members of the New Deal coalition, politically pow-
erless is nevertheless an apt description, and Missouri ex rei. 
Gaines v. Canada,u beginning the road to Brown, was decided 
almost contemporaneously with Carolene Products. When the 
Court struck down segregation, it was acting paradigmatically as 
a Footnote Four court should. The hesitancy of Nairn v. Naim,t2 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,t3 and Lassiter v. Northampton 
County Board of Electionst4 were regretable, but perhaps 
explicable.ts 
Barnette has a slightly different appearance if it is viewed 
against the background of the revulsion toward Gobitis. Frank-
furter thought his opinion would foster patriotism as the country 
needed to prepare for war. Yet as a Barnette footnote showedt6 
the similarities between the Nazi salute and the flag salute were 
obvious and uncomfortable. And patriotism was not the message 
that everyone took from Gobitis; vigilantes in small communities 
in all parts of the country acted as if the decision were an official 
imprimatur declaring open season on the Witnesses.17 Major 
newspapers, hardly the bastions of liberalism of that era, editori-
alized overwhelmingly against Frankfurter's positionts-so much 
9. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 4% (1939); Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88 (1940); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
10. In 1947 when unions were not so popular and the Justice Department was going 
after the United Mine Workers, John L. Lewis's union lost. United States v. United Mine 
Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). 
11. 305 u.s. 337 (1937). 
12. 350 u.s. 891 (1955); 350 u.s. 985 (1956). 
13. 358 U.S. 101 (1958) (sustaining a facially unconstitutional pupil placement law 
against a facial challenge). 
14. 360 u.s. 45 (1959). 
15. An unidentified justice reportedly explained Nairn v. Nairn: "One bombshell at a 
time is enough." Quoted in Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope 81 (U. of Chi. Press, 
1991). 
16. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 628 n.3. 
17. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone at 533 (cited in note 6); Peter Irons, The Courage of 
Their Convictions 23 (Free Press, 1988). On June 10, 1940 the St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
wrote: "It would be a mistake to attribute these outbreaks of violence against religious 
minorities solely to the United States Supreme Court's opinion ... Yet there can be little 
doubt that most unfortunate decision will be an encouragement for self-appointed guardi-
ans of patriotism and the national moralists to take the law into their own hands." 
(quoted in Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone at 533 (cited in note 6)). 
18. One hundred seventy-one of the leading newspapers criticized Gobitis, while 
"only a handful approved it." Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone at 532 (cited in note 6). 
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so that when Douglas told Frankfurter of Black's change of posi-
tion (to agreement with Stone's dissent), Frankfurter sarcastically 
asked if Black had been reading his Constitution. Douglas 
quipped, "No, but he has read the papers."t9 Finally, as Eleanor 
Roosevelt and others noted, there is something un-American 
about putting school children to the choice of persecution in the 
present or eternal damnation in the future. Maybe it could be 
said that everyone was a Footnote Four devotee, but a better po-
sition is that Gobitis was so wrong that lots of people knew it 
very quickly. 
Second, my argument against the dominance of Footnote 
Four is not limited to the areas where it is credited with explana-
tory force. A full review of the Court's civil liberties docket re-
minds a reader that there were 112,000 Japanese Americans, a 
quintessential discrete and insular minority, who suffered exten-
sive discrimination on the West Coast, a prejudice so pervasive 
that it included elected officials such as Earl Warren. When 
World War II came, the Japanese Americans-and they alone-
were treated as if they were hostile enemy "nonaliens"zo with 
their loyalties attaching to Japan rather than their native land. 
Thus they were interned for the duration (which turned out to be 
well after the 1944 elections and for some into 1946). The 
Supreme Court legitimized the internments, with Stone, author 
of Footnote Four, using his position as Chief Justice first to ob-
tain unanimityzt and then to hold the Court.zz The whimpering 
conclusion of Ex parte Mitsuye Endo,23 that habeas was available 
to individuals whom the government admitted were loyal, only 
underscores the enormity of Korematsu. 
The only plausible way of accommodating the wholesale vio-
lation of all civil liberties (save only the right to live) involved in 
the forced relocation to internment camps is to join the Kore-
matsu majority's conclusion that war is hell. It belabors the obvi-
ous to say that Footnote Four required the opposite outcome. 
The only way the Japanese Exclusion Cases can be accommo-
dated to Footnote Four is as a wartime exception. This seems 
valid to me, although Barnette neither discussed nor used such an 
idea; and the irrationality of relocating the Japanese in Califor-
nia, but not Hawaii, only underscores the prejudice behind Exec-
19. Irons, The Courage of Their Convictions at 23 (cited in note 17). 
20. The relocation orders referred to "alien and nonalien" rather than citizen and 
noncitizen. 
21. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
22. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
23. 323 u.s. 283 (1944). 
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utive Order 9066. Furthermore, the concept of a war-time 
exception can explain Korematsu only so long as there is no 
strong post-war example that also undermines the supposed 
dominance of Footnote Four. 
Enter the communists and their fellow travellers. From 1948 
until1962, with a notable exception for 1955-1957, reds and pinks 
were huge losers in civil liberties litigation (not to mention the 
cases never brought). This period is both slighted and misunder-
stood in legal discussions generally,24 but its impact on the Foot-
note Four thesis is comparable to that of the Japanese Exclusion 
Cases. 
Like the Japanese, it is hard to beat reds (and to a lesser 
extent pinks) as a discrete and insular minority. After the War, 
they were few in number, had no representation in any relevant 
U.S. institution, were part of no coalition that had any power. 
Indeed, if they had merely been powerless, this era would lack its 
distinctive flavor. To go with powerlessness, they were hated: 
everybody's favorite target for hostile actions.2s Douglas, despite 
his powerful dissent in Dennis v. United States,26 could not avoid 
calling communists "miserable merchants of unwanted ideas."27 
Jackson devoted his concurring opinion in Douds2s to explaining 
why the government could single out communists, but not other 
political parties, for adverse treatment. And they got it. 
The Justice Department successfully decapitated their lead-
ership with criminal prosecutions.29 The Attorney General's list 
24. As I have noted in another context, the First Amendment is a prime example 
where the traditional Whig history of progress unfolding has resulted in both ignoring and 
downsizing the results of the communist cases. Lucas A. Powe Jr., The Fourth Estate and 
the Constitution 89-90 (U. of Cal. Press, 1991). In a more current debate, Bruce Acker-
man's thesis on constitutional development, We The People: Foundations (Belknap Press, 
1991) at 108, 135-36, significantly understates the import of McCarthyism and the commu-
nist litigation. 
25. If the doctrine of suspect classifications is a roundabout way of uncovering 
official attempts to inflict inequality for its own sake-to treat a group worse not 
in the service of some overriding social goal but largely for the sake of simply 
disadvantaging its members-it would seem to follow that one set of classifica-
tions we should treat as suspicious are those that disadvantage groups we know 
to be the object of widespread vilifications, groups we know others (specifically 
those who control the legislative process) might wish to injure. 
Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 153 (cited in note 2). Although Ely goes on to offer 
important qualifications, the communists were not, for example, burglars. At their abso-
lute worst they may have been would-be Stalinist mass murderers, but no one ever sup-
plied any evidence of even the beginnings of the attempt. 
26. 341 u.s. 494 (1951). 
27. Id. at 588 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
28. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
29. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); the second-string leadership was 
convicted after Dennis and certiorari was consistently denied until the grant in Yates v. 
United States, 350 U.S. 947 (1956). 
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provided an ingenious way of denying employment not only to 
members, but to fellow travellers as well.3o The federal Loyalty 
Security Board used it with devastating effect.3t The House Un-
American Activities Committee made sure that no one missed 
the message and held hearings whose only intelligible purpose 
was "exposure for exposure's sake,"32 thereby rendering those 
named even more unemployable. And the Court affirmed it all, 
right down to the shameless reassembling into a special session 
so that the Rosenbergs could be executed without delay (even 
though opinions on why the execution could be held without de-
lay came down later).33 
Those cases dealt with citizens who were painted red or 
pink. For aliens the outcomes were even worse. In 1939 the 
Court had held on statutory grounds that an alien who had 
joined and resigned from the Communist Party could not be de-
ported based on discontinued membership simpliciter.34 Con-
gress was having none of that and reversed in the Alien 
Registration Act of 1940. The Act was unmistakably retroactive. 
Even if membership in the Communist Party had been perfectly 
legal and innocent and ended prior to the Act, membership was a 
sufficient ground for deportation. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy3s 
the Court sustained the Act on facts showing that membership 
was innocent and triggered by a specific injustice that commu-
nists were protesting at the time. 
Things got worse with the McCarran Act of 1950, in which 
one provision relieved the government of its burden of proving 
that the deportee-defendant believed in the overthrow of the 
government. The McCarran Act was sustained in Galvan v. 
Press,36 where the deportee had lived in the United States for 
three decades, worked and married, but had joined the party dur-
ing World War II (when the party actively supported the govern-
ment) and ceased membership in 1946. The majority harkened 
back to the Japanese Exclusion Cases to note that we could treat 
American citizens badly too. Eventually, in Fleming v. Nestor,37 
the Court approved a statutory bar on social security payments 
30. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). 
31. Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (affirming by an equally divided Court 
with Clark not participating; once Clark could participate, it's at least 5-4 to sustain the 
program). 
32. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 229 (1957). 
33. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953). 
34. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939) 
35. 342 u.s. 580 (1952). 
36. 347 u.s. 522 (1954). 
37. 363 u.s. 603 (1960). 
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to those deported for the transgression of joining the Communist 
Party when it was legal to do so. The idea of aliens, much less 
aliens who liked the era of the Popular Front, as a discrete and 
insular minority had not yet occurred to anyone. 
After McCarthy's late-1954 censure, the Court nibbled at 
the fringes of the loyalty-security program, culminating in a 12 
for 12 batting average for communists in 1957. Without going 
into great detail, the post-1951 communist cases typically mani-
fested an egregious injustice. In Peters v. Hobby,3s the Solicitor 
General, for the first time, refused to sign the government brief. 
(But the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division did, 
thereby meriting a D.C. Circuit appointment for Warren Burger.) 
Several of the cases were tainted with admitted perjured testi-
mony (hence the Jencks39 ruling). And cases like Schware v. 
Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico40 or Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire41 would be preposterous (were it not for subsequent 
cases like In re Anastapfo42 or Wilkinson v. United States43). 
With McCarthy wholly discredited and the cases presenting out-
rage after outrage, the Court, not unreasonably, could believe it 
was engaging in a mopping up operation, finishing off the good 
work initiated by the Senate and the liberal press. 
The Court wholly misread American politics. The congres-
sional reaction, beginning with Pennsylvania v. Nelson,44 but es-
calating geometrically in 1957, was so intense4s that the Court 
quickly retreated. In 1962, a year after it affirmed that George 
Anastaplo's belief in the principles of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence justified the Illinois Bar Association in asking him 
whether he was a communist (and further justified the bar's re-
fusal to admit him to membership upon his refusal to recant), the 
Court voted to require the NAACP to answer Florida's questions 
about supposed communist infiltration, questions that could have 
38. 349 u.s. 331 (1955). 
39. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
40. 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (evidence of exemplary moral character from 1939·53 could 
not be outweighed by Party membership during 1930s even with some arrests (without 
convictions) and use of aliases for a three year period). 
41. 354 U.S. 234 (1957) ("classical Marxist" economist's refusal to answer questions 
relating to a lecture he gave at a state university and about adherents to the Progressive 
Party held protected). 
42. 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (belief in Declaration of Independence justifies State Bar in 
asking specific questions about adherence to communism). 
43. 365 U.S. 399 (1961) (protesting HUAC hearings justifies calling person as wit-
ness and questioning him about adherence to communism). 
44. 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (holding that the Smith Act preempted a sedition conviction 
law where the sedition was against the Federal Government). 
45. Walter F. Murphy, Congress and the Court (U. of Chi. Press, 1962). 
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ended the NAACP's ability to function in the South by forcing 
access to membership lists.46 Only Frankfurter's timely stroke, 
leading to his retirement, saved the NAACP. When Gibson v. 
Florida Legislative Investigation Committee47 was reargued, 
Goldberg provided the fifth vote to reverse. 
While there ought not be ambiguities in what I'm saying, I'll 
state it more directly. When the victims of massive constitutional 
violations are very discrete - less than a million in the entire 
nation - and very insular - wholly lacking any chance at coali-
tion building or any other way of prevailing - and they are sub-
ject to hostile legislation that applies to them and them alone, 
then Footnote Four's descriptive accuracy stands or falls on 
whether they win or lose. The Japanese Americans and commu-
nists lost big time. If Footnote Four has any real meaning, these 
cases must come out the other way. When they don't, Footnote 
Four doesn't. 
That takes us to 1962, twenty-four years after Footnote Four. 
This almost halves the claim that Footnote Four describes the 
half century of constitutional law following its announcement. In 
1962, however, Baker v. Carr was decided over Frankfurter's 
Chicken Little dissent, and Frankfurter departed, thereby creat-
ing the real Warren Court. From Goldberg's confirmation on, 
there seemed to be48 five votes for anything, and anything cer-
tainly meant Footnote Four. Furthermore, for reasons that 
stunned both conservatives and liberals, adding Warren Burger 
and Harry Blackmun and then Lewis Powell and William Rehn-
quist did not tum the Court into a set of knee-jerk "strict con-
structionists," although by the mid-1970s it did result in the 
Court settling comfortably into a defense of whatever constitu-
tional status quo then existed.49 
II 
There are no losing litigants comparable to the Japanese 
Americans or the communists in the decade following Frank-
furter's retirement. The best one could offer is that women never 
won in the 1960s. But after Hoyt v. Floridaso they didn't lose 
46. Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief453 (N.Y.U. Press,1983) (reporting the initial 5-
4 vote to sustain the Florida Legislative Committee contempt finding). 
47. 372 u.s. 539 (1963). 
48. But see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 
(1965); Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
49. L.A. Powe, Jr., The Court Between Hegemonies, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 31 
(1992). 
50. 368 u.s. 57 (1961). 
1994] FOOTNOTE FOUR 205 
either. Between that 1961 decision and Reed v. Reed,5t a decade 
later, there were no cases. 
That omission aside, everything else from the "real" Warren 
Court looks very much like Footnote Four. And that trend con-
tinued for women and aliens into the early 1970s. In no prior or 
subsequent era was there such protection for free speech and 
voting rights. New York Times v. Sullivan commenced a singu-
larly remarkable era in First Amendment jurisprudence, encom-
passing not only libel, but also domestic security, street 
demonstrations, and obscenity, implementing the legacy of 
Holmes and Brandeis. "[T]he Court's decisions generally pushed 
for a newer, farther boundary."s2 "Neither before or since has 
there been such an outpouring of law on freedom of speech and 
the press. And never has it been so protective of the interests of 
dissent and so skeptical of government claims of the social harm 
that supposedly would be forthcoming" if its claims were not sus-
tained.s3 As a result, the Court no longer clung to its absolutist 
position that First Amendment claims could never overcome the 
government's need to root out communism wherever found; in 
the post-Frankfurter era, accused reds and pinks won all their 
cases. For the first time in years there was no group that was a 
consistent First Amendment loser, because losses, like Adderley 
v. Floridas4 or Walker v. Birminghamss or Miskin v. New Yorks6 
were rare. Here United States v. O'Briens7 and Ginzburg v. 
United States,ss however, stand out; the Court should have 
known better. In the latter case there is no excuse because the 
Brennan majority was taking a minority of one and creating an 
ex post facto law to get him; in the former one might offer the 
excuse that the vote on the case occurred prior to the Tet Offen-
sive and its changing of public opinion. 
With voting, all claims prevailed. Baker v. Carr had set the 
stage, but it seems unlikely that anyone could have anticipated 
51. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
52. Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution at 97 (cited in note 24). 
53. Id. at 104. 
54. 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding trespass conviction for students demonstrating 
outside a jail to protest arrest and imprisonment of fellow students who had attempted to 
integrate movie theaters). 
55. 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (contempt order for violating temporary injunction valid 
even though injunction forbid violating facially unconstitutional ordinance). 
56. 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (S-M magazines can be obscene if they appeal to the pruri-
ent interest of their intended audience). 
57. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning not protected speech). 
58. 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (a bad man who "panders" in selling smut may be convicted 
for obscenity even if materials not obscene). 
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the sweep of Reynolds v. Sims,s9 Katzenbach v. Morgan,60 and 
Kramer v. Union Free School District.6t 
The Court's intensive run on civil rights during this period 
began with a Goldberg opinion announcing that the time for all 
deliberate speed was over.62 In the context of schools, the run 
accelerated with Green v. County School Board of New Kent 
County's sacking of freedom of choice plans and demanding in-
stead plans that promised "realistically to work ... now."63 
Whatever ambiguities were left ended three years later when 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education64 held that 
"results" meant integration. The Court's protections of blacks 
moved west to invalidate California's referendum repeal of its 
fair housing laws6s and north to invalidate Akron's singling out 
fair housing as specially calling for a referendum.66 The run 
reached its zenith in Keyes v. School District Number 1, Denver, 
Colorado61 where the Court decided that it would give the North 
the benefits that Swann was bestowing upon the South. The ex-
tension of busing to the North was one of the most vitamin-en-
riched determinations the Court had ever made. (Of course its 
force was blunted a year later by Milliken v. Bradley.68) Indeed, 
the breadth and scope of the Court's commitment to blacks only 
underscores the losses in Swain v. Alabama69 and Adderley v. 
FloridaJO 
The Court even tried to make poverty fit within Footnote 
Four. Although it was a false start, Harper v. Virginia Board of 
Electionsn actually equated the poor with race as having immu-
table characteristics. The high tide of activism for the poor be-
cause they were poor came with Goldberg v. Kelly.n Little 
noticed is the fact that with Shapiro v. Thompson73 even Earl 
Warren jumped off. Then Dandridge v. Williams74 signaled a halt 
59. 377 u.s. 533 (1964). 
60. 384 U.S. 641 (1%6). 
61. 395 u.s. 621 (1969). 
62. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963). 
63. 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original). 
64. 402 u.s. 1 (1971). 
65. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
66. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
67. 413 u.s. 189 (1973). 
68. 418 u.s. 717 (1974). 
69. 380 u.s. 202 (1965). 
70. 385 u.s. 39 (1966). 
71. 383 u.s. 663 (1%6). 
72. 397 u.s. 254 (1970). 
73. 394 u.s. 618 (1969). 
74. 397 u.s. 471 (1970). 
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that San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez7s 
made official. 
Still, the poor in the criminal justice process were big win-
ners for a while. The Court initiated a wave of constitutional re-
form of the criminal justice system, first by federalizing it through 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights and then by attempting to 
spread lawyers throughout the system to effectuate the new guar-
antees. Douglas v. California76 illustrates the latter with its use 
of equal protection to require counsel on first appeals for indi-
gents. Although one could see Douglas as building on the due 
process indigency principle of Griffin v. Illinois ,n the latter 
looked, as had Betts v. Brady,1s to judges figuring out for the 
defendant what his claim might be (by their reading of the tran-
script); Douglas, like Gideon v. Wainwright,79 was about lawyers, 
and their ability to alert overworked and possibly uncaring 
judges about the basics of the defendant's case. Giving defend-
ants lawyers was the only realistic hope of transforming the anti-
quated system. Additionally, Fay v. Noiaso transformed the 
federal courts into tribunals to review state criminal convictions. 
All of these reflected the political reality that states were not go-
ing to legislate added protections for criminal defendants. The 
Warren Court had concluded that the full force of the criminal 
justice system rarely fell on the more affluent; therefore by ad-
ding procedural barriers and lawyers to raise them, the Court 
could reduce the disparities between the rights of the rich and 
poor. Possibly the culmination of this was the Court's 1972 con-
clusion that the nation was ready to rid itself of the barbaric 
death penalty.s1 
Reducing disparities offers a good explanation for Griswold 
v. Connecticut as well. While the case can be characterized as a 
throwback to Lochner v. New York, Planned Parenthood, the 
real defendant, was an organization whose donors did not need 
its services. But it believed that those lacking affluence were 
likely to need them; so, I think, did the Court. 
Roe v. Wade is susceptible to a similar analysis. Prior to Roe, 
legal abortions were increasing geometrically,sz and Roe, like 
75. 411 u.s. 1 (1973). 
76. 372 u.s. 353 (1%3). 
77. 351 u.s. 12 (1956). 
78. 316 u.s. 455 (1942). 
79. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
80. 372 U.S. 391 (1%3). 
81. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
82. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 178 (cited in note 15). 
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Griswold, provided opportunities for the less affluent to enjoy 
the rights their more affluent sisters were already exercising. 
Lest this analysis seem a bit revisionist, Lewis Powell, in a con-
versation in the faculty lounge at The University of Texas Law 
School, articulated it in the mid-1970s. 
Between 1968 and 1973 the Court added three further 
groups to Footnote Four's embrace: illegitimates, aliens, and wo-
men. In a pair of 1968 decisions, the Court knocked out the part 
of Louisiana's wrongful death statutes that denied benefits to it-
legitimates and their mothers.s3 There was some backing and 
filling in Labine v. Vincent,B4 but Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. 
Ca.ss proved that aberrational. Aliens, too, found their Footnote 
Four place. Graham v. Richardsons6 hinted at the promise that 
In re Griffithss? fulfilled. Finally, when the perceived role of wo-
men in society had changed so much for elites that both Lyndon 
Johnson and Richard Nixon supported the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, the ERA sailed through the House of Representatives 350-
15, only to falter in the Senate over the issue of whether ERA 
meant that women had to be drafted too. Taking its cue from the 
House, the Court responded with Reed,ss thus preparing the 
ground for its own internal debate in Frontiero v. Richardsons9 
about whether to preempt the Article V process by announcing 
that the Fourteenth Amendment already accomplished every-
thing the ERA could do. Ultimately the Court decided to let 
ERA run its course. While women thus did not achieve full 
Footnote Four status, they were closer than ever before (or 
since). 
Jehovah's Witnesses had apparently won all the rights they 
needed; their last appearance was in the 1950s. Just before 
Frankfurter's retirement the Court refused to exempt Jewish 
merchants (or anyone else) from the Blue Laws.90 Yet in Engle 
v. Vitafe91 it banned prayer in the schools, and one year later Bi-
ble reading as well.92 Finally, by the end of the Warren era, Ar-
83. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1%8). 
84. 401 u.s. 532 (1971). 
85. 406 u.s. 164 (1972). 
86. 403 u.s. 365 (1971). 
87. 413 u.s. 717 (1973). 
88. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
89. 411 u.s. 677 (1973). 
90. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1966). 
91. 370 u.s. 421 (1%2). 
92. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1%3). 
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kansas' monkey law was held unconstitutional.93 (Although its 
prior existence did not seem to harm a young Bill Clinton.) 
As this brief blitz of the post-Frankfurter cases shows, there 
is much to be said for Footnote Four's descriptive abilities. 
Though the congruence is not perfect, that probably asks too 
much. And there are no glaring examples, such as the Japanese 
Americans or the communists, which make belief in Footnote 
Four's dominance implausible in this era. 
Ill 
Yet maybe there is an alternative view that explains equally 
well. The Footnote Four explanation requires a fairly precipitous 
break in 1962. There is an alternative that is about as plausible 
and requires no major break. It can be summed up easily: "our 
[federal] government right or wrong."94 
The New Deal appointees rubber stamped all federal eco-
nomic legislation. Indeed in the same memo that wondered 
about the Court's function, Jackson also noted that the govern-
ment lawyers no longer took a threat of unconstitutionality seri-
ously.9s The Japanese Exclusion Cases were tough on the justices 
because the injustice was so plain, but this was their government 
and its racism was explained away. In the first communist case96 
Jackson articulated a theory that communists weren't like us and 
the initial results were easy; only later did the injustices seem 
plain. When the Court was put to the difficult choice of picking 
between branches, it took the politically popular option97 and re-
jected Truman's claims to seize the domestic steel industry.9s 
The Court of Roosevelt's first term had sailed against the polit-
ical gale; the New Deal appointees glided effortlessly with the 
wind. Thus when they misanticipated the mood on the flag salute 
in Gobitis, Barnette swiftly followed. 
These cases, augmented by World War II, represented a fun-
damental shift favoring national power. Although Brown is 
more complicated, it is the beginning of the second stage of that 
93. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
94. A slight modification of Stephen Decatur's famous 1816 toast: "Our country! In 
her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right-but our country, 
right or wrong." Stephen Decatur in 6 The United States Encyclopedia of History 1054, 
1057 (Curtis Publishing Co., 1967). 
95. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone at 594 (cited in note 6). 
96. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
97. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court (Morrow, 1987). 
98. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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national shift. The White Primary Cases99 followed by Sweatt v. 
Paintertoo and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Educationtot had laid the groundwork for the imposition of en-
lightened-read elite Northern-values on the South. There was 
every reason to believe that with the Democratic Party (which 
controlled the South) committed nationally to civil rights and the 
Justice Department under both Truman and Eisenhower urging 
an end to school segregation, the South was isolated and ending 
segregation would be readily accepted elsewhere. Furthermore, 
it is conceivable that if Southerners had not been able to inter-
twine segregation with anticommunism following Pennsylvania v. 
Nelsontoz and the controversial1956 Term that followed, thereby 
creating a strong congressional backlash against the Court,to3 the 
Court might not even have paused, as massive resistance forced it 
to do. 
Indeed, the Court may have wrongly sensed a shift after Mc-
Carthy's downfall and thereby begun its procedural and statutory 
nitpicking of the loyalty security program to death between 1955 
and 1957. But, like its later misreading of the mood on capital 
punishment, its cases created a tremendous legislative backlash, 
and the Court went into full retreat until the mid-1960s when 
there could be no claim that the federal government and popular 
opinion cared much about loyalty security any more. 
The 1960 and, especially, the 1964 elections brought elite 
Northern opinion into political dominance nationally. The best 
and the brightest staffed the executive branch, and Congress, 
even after 1968, stayed in the hands of domestic liberals. Begin-
ning with Kennedy and accelerating with Johnson, the Court had 
a very protective (and supportive) umbrella. Both presidents 
embraced Earl Warren and defended the Court on reapportion-
ment and religion, while the Justice Department cued the Court 
that civil rights support was forthcoming. With its political sup-
port secure, the Court began its nationalizing trend with a ven-
geance. It is important to reiterate that I use nationalizing here 
to mean a vision of national values. The Court was eradicating 
what was different-backward-with the intent to replace it with 
what any right-thinking Ivy League graduate would believe. 
99. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
100. 339 u.s. 629 (1950). 
101. 339 u.s. 637 (1950). 
102. 350 u.s. 497 (1956). 
103. Murphy, Congress and the Court 182-83 (cited in note 45); McCloskey, The 
American Supreme Court at 197-200 (cited in note 3). 
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The South, necessarily and properly, would be a huge loser. 
Its distinctiveness was etched in the poisoning of its institutions 
by segregation, and the Court's assault never let up.104 But rural 
Americans and those who did not belong to mainstream-liberal 
Protestant or Jewish denominations were also fit candidates for 
improvement. The same could be said for antiquated criminal 
justice systems whose values and procedures were mired in the 
era of the Wickersham Report. 
Chief Justice Warren blamed rural voters for the plight of 
urban America; with the reapportionment decisions, he stripped 
them of their undeserved political power in both the Congress 
and the states. After a misstep in upholding Blue Laws (on the 
quaint theory that picking Sunday for a day of rest had nothing 
to do with Christianity), the Court banned prayer and Bible-
reading from the public schools to the howls of more culturally 
conservative religions. But that was not their sole defeat. Roth 
v. United Statestos had begun the eradication of Victorian laws on 
pornography; the 1966 Trilogy,106 with Redrup v. New Yorkt07 
and Stanley v. Georgiatos following, appeared to be a clean sweep 
in the name of sexual promiscuity. There was some backsliding 
in 1971,109 but it was serious only in the sense it did not finalize 
the Redrup-Stanley solution that anything goes for consenting 
adults. Finally, over the opposition of police forces everywhere, 
the Court federalized criminal procedure. The culmination was 
Furman v. Georgiallo with its intended elimination of capital 
punishment. And believing, probably not without reason, that 
state courts would be unreceptive to the new national vision, the 
Court refashioned federal habeas to allow direct federal judicial 
supervision of state court processes. 
The surprise is that this trend continued into Richard 
Nixon's second term. But just as Nixon himself presided over a 
much more liberal domestic policy than was perceived at the 
time, so did the Court that knocked out capital punishment, 
came close to preempting the Article V ratification process with 
104. A startling exception was jury peremptory challenges. Swain v. Alabama, 380 
U.S. 202 (1%5), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
105. 354 u.s. 476 (1957). 
106. A Book Named John Cleland's Memoirs of a Women of Pleasure v. Attorney 
Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); 
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). 
107. 386 u.s. 767 (1966). 
108. 394 u.s. 557 (1969). 
109. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); United States v. Thirty·Seven Photo-
graphs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971). 
110. 408 u.s. 238 (1972). 
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ERA, was so enamored with the integrative possibilities of bus-
ing that it thrust it North, and saw in the persistent legislative 
victories of the pro-abortion forces a fatal slowness that required 
an immediate judicial solution. To be sure, the Court never fol-
lowed Frank Michelman and made the Great Society a constitu-
tional requirement, but it did substantially increase the 
constitutional protections of women, aliens, and illegitimates. 
Sometime in 1973 this flood tide of creative constitutional 
decisionmaking ran its course. Thereafter, until Lewis Powell's 
retirement, the Court neither gave much nor took much. It trod 
within the constitutional status quo already established. 
IV 
If it were not for the decade beginning in 1963, I strongly 
doubt that scholars would be claiming that Footnote Four de-
scribed the Court's behavior.m No other decade-long period so 
consistently mirrored what a Court believing in Footnote Four 
would do. With this key decade in place, it becomes possible to 
project both forward and backward and conclude that Footnote 
Four has had a good half century run. 
The cases in that decade do look like they were decided by a 
Footnote Four court, and many were decided in the face of very 
significant public opinion. But that hostile public opinion was 
overwhelmingly located in the South and, following the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, could be almost completely dis-
counted. Parts of the North did concur with their isolated South-
ern brethren, especially on the religion and pornography 
decisions, and, of course, there was a regular drumbeat about the 
explosive criminal procedure cases like Miranda v. Arizona.112 
The creative period ended when it was overwhelmed by 
both new reasons to dislike the Court and greater numbers of 
Americans adhering to an anti-Court position. Furman was a 
factor; Swann and Keyes contributed mightily by actually giving 
people the experience they were protesting; and, of course, there 
was Roe coupled with a strong contemporaneous claim of its 
illegitimacy. 
Until busing and abortion combined to recreate a strong 
anti-Court constituency, Northern elites were solidly behind the 
Court's results and it was their opinion that counted (until some-
thing like what Richard Nixon called middle America could be 
111. An exception is McCloskey, who saw Footnote Four from the vantage point of 
1960. For reasons already expressed I believe he is wrong. 
112. 384 u.s. 436 (1%6). 
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mobilized). Maybe educated Northerners were Footnote Four 
buffs without ever having read Carolene Products, but a better 
explanation, I think, is that, like the Court, they too favored rid-
ding the country of backwards laws, to make the country one, 
and with the best-their-values available. That meant civil 
rights, reapportionment, religion in the closet (or at a civil rights 
demonstration), the government out of the bedroom and librar-
ies, a better break for the poor, and, when women demanded 
justice, justice for them, too. Doing this was not because the win-
ners were politically powerless, but because the outcomes were 
right and could be protected (unlike in the 1950s) from signifi-
cant political backlash. This, I think, is a better explanation for 
the constitutional explosion following 1963 and this, in an impor-
tant way, ties back into the nationalizing that was going on in the 
quarter century following the "switch in time that saved nine." 
It's not Footnote Four, although often it looks similar; instead, it 
was an attempt to make the nation one with a decidedly North-
ern cast to how that one would be made. 
At least two questions arise. Am I correct and if so is there 
anything that accounts for the persistence of the belief in Foot-
note Four? As to the first, I readily acknowledge that there is 
enough mushiness in Footnote Four that the cases could be 
viewed somewhat differently than the way I cast them, and 
maybe be made to conform better descriptively. But I've lis-
tened to debates over a lot of years and I don't think my under-
standing of how "Footnote Four" is used is off the mark.tt3 If 
this needs bolstering, none of the colleagues I acknowledged in 
my own first footnote thought I misdescribed Footnote Four 
either. So we come to the second question: the persistence of the 
Footnote Four theory. 
The explanation is rather straightforward. Footnote Four is 
the principal justification offered for the role of the Supreme 
Court in post-New Deal American politics.l14 It legitimates the 
Court's determinations that certain laws are unconstitutional. 
Neither the Court nor academic commentators are willing to say 
that "oh, yes; that was struck down because elite Northern opin-
ion holds a different view." Instead, the Court and commenta-
tors explain, with or without a specific citations, "a law is never 
invalidated unless [it violates Footnote Four]." Because Foot-
113. Doug Laycock, however, takes his sophisticated textualism from paragraph one 
of Footnote Four and thus believes that the common assumption that Footnote Four is 
"really" paragraphs two and three is erroneous. 
114. In Jack Balkin's religious imagery, Carolene Products plays St. Paul to West 
Coast Hotel's Jesus. J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 275, 296 (1989). 
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note Four serves as a (and often the) legitimating theory for 
modern judicial review, it is important that the cases conform. 
To make the cases conform, theory becomes ideology with all the 
attendant blinders. Commentators can and do wish theory and 
results conformed, and they often grant their own wishes. But 
that doesn't make it so. 
